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I. Introduction 
In discussions of the regulation of autonomous systems, private law — 
specifically, company law — has been neglected as a potential legal and 
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regulatory interface.  As one of us has suggested previously,1 there are 
several possibilities for the creation of company structures that might 
provide functional and adaptive legal “housing” for advanced software, 
various types of artificial intelligence, and other programmatic systems and 
organizations — phenomena that we refer to here collectively as autonomous 
systems, for ease of reference.  In particular, this prior work introduces the 
notion that an operating agreement or private entity constitution (such as a 
corporation’s charter or a partnership’s operating agreement) can adopt, as 
the acts of a legal entity, the state or actions of arbitrary physical systems.  
We call this the algorithm-agreement equivalence principle.2  Given this 
principle and the present capacities existing forms of legal entities, 
companies of various kinds can serve as a mechanism through which 
autonomous systems might engage with the legal system. 
This paper considers the implications of this possibility from a 
comparative and international perspective.  Our goal is to suggest how, under 
U.S., German, Swiss, and U.K. law, company law might furnish the 
functional and adaptive legal “housing” for an autonomous system — and, 
in turn, we aim to inform systems designers, regulators, and others who are 
interested in, encouraged by, or alarmed at the possibility that an autonomous 
system may “inhabit” a company and thereby gain some of the incidents of 
legal personality.  We do not aim here to be normative.  Instead, the paper 
lays out a template suggesting how existing laws might provide a potentially 
unexpected regulatory framework for autonomous systems, and to explore 
some legal consequences of this possibility.  We do suggest that these 
considerations might spur others to consider the relevant provisions of their 
own national laws with a view to locating similar legal “spaces” that 
autonomous systems could “inhabit.” 
II. In the Company of Autonomous Systems: The American 
Limited Liability Company and Beyond 
To frame the discussion, we consider two examples that are either 
possible under current technology or may become at least partly possible 
within a decade or two: 
1. Self-managed, rule-bound online commercial services.  As purely 
online services, such as “cloud storage” for file hosting or “cloud computing” 
 
 1.  Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of 
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015) [hereinafter “Business Entities and 
Autonomous Systems”]; Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the 
Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1495–1500 (2014). 
 2.  Cf. Bayern, supra note 1, at 99. 
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for scalable distributed processing, increase in complexity and economic 
importance, a market niche may be filled by online services that operate 
independently and are managed purely by algorithmic rule-sets.  Putting 
aside for the moment questions about who would set up such systems or 
profit from them, it is conceptually straightforward to imagine an automated 
cloud-storage service that accepts online payment (perhaps in the form of 
cryptocurrency) through a standardized automated interface, uses this 
payment to reserve and maintain storage from a collection of back-end 
providers like Amazon or Oracle, and provides automated customer-service 
functions such as file retrieval and metadata management.  The contracts 
between the service and its customers are drafted entirely in terms of the 
capabilities and limitations of the algorithms that operate the service; for 
example, customers may pay for a particular set of virtual services specified 
by a formal set of rules and implemented in software by the online provider. 
2. Perpetual autonomous foundation.  In 1996, internet entrepreneur 
and activist Brewster Kahle established the Internet Archive, which 
replicates and aims to preserve large amounts of diverse data, much like a 
classical library.  The Internet Archive, accessible at archive.org, stores 
among other things time-stamped snapshots of the evolving web, collections 
of music and books, and so on.  The organization has been run largely as a 
traditional nonprofit, both functionally and legally — that is, it has a board 
and officers and employees — but consider a close analogue of this 
organization: Suppose a wealthy founder like Kahle decides to implement in 
software a long-term archival tool that is meant to store data perpetually.  
Suppose that, either to achieve redundancy in data replication and 
preservation or because at some point software may seem a more reliable 
tool than a traditional nonprofit foundation, this founder desires to establish 
a perpetual, autonomous foundation that captures and preserves information.  
The founder does not want to employ, and perhaps does not trust, individual 
people to manage the perpetual mission of the organization; instead, the 
founder wishes to commit certain resources to the organization’s software 
initially and then permit the software to act in an economically, functionally, 
and perhaps legally autonomous manner.  Alternatively, imagine a founder 
who wishes to set up a grant-making nonprofit that relies exclusively on 
formally determined, crowd-based decisions to determine the recipients of 
grants. 
We take no specific normative position on the social desirability of 
these possible arrangements. We do conjecture that some actors may desire 
them and, if seeking to realize such arrangements, will need their legal 
consequences to be clarified.  We also recognize that regulators and 
policymakers may wish to encourage, to oppose, or to channel these 
possibilities for various ends. 
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As one of us has previously suggested, speaking purely as a matter of 
positive law, modern business-entity law in the U.S. would appear to permit 
either of the two examples above — and indeed essentially any arbitrary 
configuration of software, rules, or ordered physical states — to achieve a 
functional equivalent of legal personhood.  What this means in practice is 
that the software-driven commercial service, perpetual foundation, or similar 
arrangement could, under present U.S. law, interact with the legal system in 
the manner that familiar entities normally interact: make contracts, own 
property, be a legal principal, be a legal agent, file a lawsuit (possibly with 
the help of a legal agent), be sued, etc.  Constitutional rights in the U.S. for 
legal entities are the subject of significant debate, but at least these private 
rights seem available under U.S. law. 
In the US, the mechanism to achieve legal independence for an 
autonomous entity arises primarily under Limited Liability Company (LLC) 
law, mainly because such law is extremely flexible. The very point of 
modern LLCs appears to be to give legal entity status to any arrangement 
that has an operating agreement.  Because an “operating agreement” can 
essentially defer to the rules embodied in software, the autonomous 
commercial service and the autonomous foundation in our examples might 
use the LLC form.  State LLC statutes often do not permit or envision this 
particular type of independent entity, but previous work by one of the present 
authors has suggested some relatively straightforward steps to create 
autonomous LLCs.  In particular: 
 
(1) an individual member creates a member-managed LLC,  filing the 
appropriate paperwork with the state; (2) the individual (along, 
possibly, with the LLC, which is controlled by the sole member)  
enters into an operating agreement governing the conduct of the LLC; 
(3) the operating agreement specifies that the LLC will take actions 
as determined by an autonomous system, specifying terms or 
conditions as appropriate to achieve the autonomous system’s legal 
goals; (4) the individual transfers ownership of any relevant physical 
apparatus of the autonomous system to the LLC; (5) the sole member 
withdraws from the LLC, leaving the LLC without any members.  
The result is potentially a perpetual LLC — a new legal person — 
that requires no ongoing intervention from any preexisting legal 
person in order to maintain its status.3 
 
 
 3.  Shawn Bayern, The Implication of Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous 
Systems, 7 EUR. J. RISK REGULATION 297, 303 (2016). 
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As previously suggested, existing partnership law would appear to 
allow such steps.  Given the flexibility of the law in this area, the U.S. 
approach raises an interesting possibility: In most cases, any arrangement 
can establish “legal person” status in the US; sophisticated philosophical or 
technical analysis of autonomous systems would not be necessary.  As a 
result, in the spirit of the evolving common law of commerce, U.S. law is 
potentially quite adaptive to business realities, although of course its current 
state may well be too flexible for those who wish autonomous legal entities 
to be restricted. 
Very broadly speaking, the laws of other major countries provide for 
similar ways for memberless entities controlled by autonomous systems to 
interact with the existing legal system, although most legal systems are 
currently less open-ended than the LLC acts of U.S. states and, in many cases, 
their restrictions and conceptions of entities raise particular issues for the 
creation and channeling of autonomous entities.  The three subsections below 
consider the potential status of memberless entities managed by autonomous 
systems in (A) Germany, (B) Switzerland, and (C) the United Kingdom. 
A.  The Memberless Limited Liability Company under German Company 
Law 
Under German law, the legal form of limited liability companies 
(Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, typically abbreviated GmbH) 
promises an interesting option for autonomous systems to inhabit.  Germany 
indeed prides itself for being the original birthplace of such companies, since 
they were already introduced in 1892 by a specific code4 and have spread all 
over the world since then.5  Moreover, the German academic debate about 
the concept of limited liability and separate legal personality has been 
particularly rich ever since Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s and Otto von 
Gierke’s famous debate about legal personhood (‘reale 
Verbandspersönlichkeit’).6  More recently, there has also been an intensive 
academic debate among legal philosophers7 and also among constitutional 
 
 4.  Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung [GmbH] [Limited 
Liability Companies Act], Apr. 20, 1892, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 477 (Ger). 
 5.  See, e.g., Jan Thiessen, Transfer von GmbH-Recht im 20 Jahrhundert – Export, Import, 
Binnenhandel, RECHTSTRANSFER IN DER GESCHICHTE: LEGAL TRANSFER IN HISTORY 446 
(Vanessa Duss et al. eds., 2006). 
 6.  Compare Friedrich Karl von Savigny, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS, §§ 
60, 85 (1840), with OTTO FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, DAS WESEN DER MENSCHLICHEN VERBÄNDE 
23 (1902). 
 7.  Gunter Teubner, Elektronische Agenten und große Menschenaffen: Zur Ausweitung des 
Akteursstatus in Recht und Politik, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 5 (2006); Malte-
Christian Gruber, Was spricht gegen Maschinenrechte?, AUTONOME AUTOMATEN 191 (Jochen 
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lawyers8 as to whether the legal system should or could attribute legal 
personality to autonomous systems that can act, learn and communicate on a 
self-referential basis. 
Surprisingly, however, those two strands of discussion so far have not 
been brought together.  As far as we are aware, there is no discussion under 
current, positive company law yet as to whether or not a GmbH can provide 
legal housing for autonomous systems.9  Yet, due to the flexible and enabling 
character of its legal form, it seems plausible that the “legal homunculus of 
genius design” — as the GmbH was once called10 — could effectively 
provide autonomous systems with legal personality. 
In particular, the possibility to form single-member limited liability 
companies (“Ein-Mann-GmbH”) could pave the way for such creatures. In 
German law, that possibility was introduced in 1980 and allows for the 
formation and existence of limited liability companies with only one 
member.11 Despite initial conceptual criticism — mainly concerning the 
contractual nature of companies — the single-member limited liability 
company is widely accepted today.  As its name implies, however, it still 
requires at least one member, and unlike in American LLC law,12 that 
member needs to be a natural — not an artificial — person.  Accordingly, § 
1 of the German Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) states that “a 
company with limited liability (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, 
GmbH) may be formed by one person or several persons pursuant to the 
provisions of this Act for any purpose permitted by law” (emphasis added).  
As a consequence, the formation of a company without any such person is 
precluded.  This preclusion, however, does not prevent an existing single-
 
Bung & Sascha Ziemann eds., 2015); cf. Lothar Philipps, Gibt es ein Recht auch für ein Volk von 
künstlichen Wesen, wenn sie nur Verstand haben?, JENSEITS DES FUNKTIONALISMUS: ARTHUR 
KAUFMANN ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 119, 119–26 (1989). 
 8.  E.g., Jens Kersten, Menschen und Maschinen, 70 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 1, 6 (Jan. 2015) 
(in favor of such possibility); cf. HANS PETER BULL, Sinn und Unsinn des Datenschutzes, MOHR 
SIEBECK 120 (2015) (strictly opposing). 
 9.  Very recently from a company law perspective, however, but again largely as a normative 
claim, Jan-Erik Schirmer, Rechtsfähige Roboter?, 71 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 660 (July 2016). 
 10.  Wolfgang Zöllner, 100 Jahre GmbH - Überlegungen zu Grundfragen des GmbH-Rechts 
aus Anlaß ihres Jubiläums, 47 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 381 (1992). 
 11.  More extensively, see, e.g., Karl-Heinz Fezer, Die Einmanngründung der GmbH, 
JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 608–18 (1981); Werner Flume, Die GmbH-Einmanngründung, 146 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZHR) 205 (1982); 
Peter Ulmer, Die Einmanngründung der GmbH – ein Danaergeschenk?, in BETRIEBS-BERATER 
(BB), 1001 (1980); see also HEINZ-G. TRÖSTER, DIE EINMANN-GMBH – EIN BEITRAG ZUR LEHRE 
VON DER RELATIVITÄT DER RECHTSPERSÖNLICHKEIT (1971). 
 12.  See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. Law § 701(a)(4) (1999) (referring to a temporary memberless 
period of “one hundred eighty days” but permitting the LLC to remain memberless for any “other 
period as is provided for in the operating agreement”). 
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member limited liability company to “lose” its only member, for example by 
an acquisition of its own shares, by testamentary succession, or by a 
forfeiture or redemption of its shares.13  As a consequence, the existing 
GmbH would potentially transform into a memberless company — that is, a 
company without any natural persons as members,14 but which could well 
serve as a shell for an autonomous system. 
So far, such memberless limited liability companies (“Kein-Mann-
GmbH”) have not had much significance in practice.  Nonetheless, their 
potential existence has been subject of academic debate ever since Max 
Hachenburg published an article on that topic in 1915.15  Nowadays the topic 
is regarded as a “dogmatic touchstone of German corporate law.”16  We will 
see, however, that the arguments of this old debate acquire renewed salience 
once we add autonomous systems to the picture. 
Basically, there are three or four different dogmatic positions with 
respect to memberless limited liability companies in Germany.17  Some 
argue that such entities are strictly illegal and that every legal act that may 
lead to their creation — for example, the acquisition of a company’s own 
shares — must itself be void because it aims at an impossible legal 
consequence.18  However, acts that have a memberless GmbH as a 
consequence may well rest on legitimate reasons, and sometimes these acts 
may even be mandated by the law itself — for example in inheritance cases 
where the company succeeds its only member as the owner of its shares.19  
 
 13.  See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Comment on § 1, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG 
para. 80 (2nd ed. 2015). 
 14.  Extensively discussed by various monographs, cf. ARND BRETSCHNEIDER, DIE 
GESELLSCHAFTERLOSE GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (1st ed. 1994); DIRK 
OLDENBURG, DIE KEINMANN-GMBH – EIN UNMÖGLICHES RECHTSGEBILDE? (1985); ALFRED 
PAULICK, DIE GMBH OHNE GESELLSCHAFTER (1979); HEINO RÜCK, DIE KEINMANN-
GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (1994). 
 15.  Max Hachenburg, Zum Erwerbe eigener Geschäftsanteile durch die Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung, FESTSCHRIFT FOR COHN 79 (1915). 
 16.  Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 81. 
 17.  See Rolf Steding, Die gesellschafterlose GmbH – eine rechtlich zulässige 
Unternehmensvariante?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (NZG) 57, 60 (2003); 
Olaf Sosnitza, Comment on § 33, GMBH-GESETZ para. 53 (Lutz Michalski ed., 2nd ed. 2010); 
Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 81. 
 18.  Karl Becker, Der Erwerb eigener Geschäftsanteile der GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 
(GmbHR) 700, 704 (1938); Wolfgang Hösel, Eigene Geschäftsanteile der GmbH, DEUTSCHE 
NOTAR-ZEITSCHRIFT (DNotZ) 5, 7 (1958).  See also Friedrich Buchwald, Der eigene Anteil der 
GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU (GmbHR) 169, 171 (1958); Karl Winkler, Der Erwerb eigener 
Geschäftsanteile durch die GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU (GmbHR) 73, 77 (1972) (with respect to 
the voidance of such legal acts in particular). 
 19.  See, e.g., KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 995 (4th ed. 2002); PAULICK, 
supra note 15, at 92–105. 
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Other authors argue that the existence of memberless limited liability 
companies is possible, even on a permanent basis.  For example, Max 
Hachenburg claimed that the shell of a corporation may well persist 
indefinitely despite its loss of members.20  The prevailing opinion takes a 
middle course and holds that memberless limited liability companies can 
indeed exist, but only during a transitional period before the company is 
ultimately dissolved. 
Among the advocates of this middle position, two different views can 
be distinguished.  Some argue that the dissolution of the company starts 
automatically once it has been transformed into a memberless company and 
that continuation of the company requires the passing of a specific 
resolution.21  Others argue in favor of a mere duty to start dissolution 
proceedings by appointment of a temporary executive director.22  These two 
positions contrast (1) an opt-out from automatic dissolution with (2) an opt-
in to dissolution.  Two principal arguments are brought forward in favor of 
automatic dissolution with opt-out — first, that automatic dissolution 
clarifies the point in time when dissolution begins, and second, that only 
automatic dissolution avoids the question of the permissible timeframe for 
the existence of the memberless company.23 
Much more fundamental, however — and much more important with 
respect to autonomous systems — are the core arguments that are brought 
forward against the (permanent) existence of memberless companies.  From 
a doctrinal — and somewhat circular — perspective, the possibility of such 
companies would conflict with the nature of “membership” companies as 
those that have members.24  More formally, such companies might also 
enable an evasion of the law of foundations.25  A further argument concerns 
the essential core of memberless companies: such companies lack a 
 
 20.  Max Hachenburg, Zum Erwerbe eigener Geschäftsanteile durch die Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung, FESTSCHRIFT FOR COHN 79, 88-91 (1915). See also BRETSCHNEIDER, supra 
note 15, at 47–49 & 55; Peter Kreutz, Von der Einmann- zur “Keinmann”-GmbH, FESTSCHRIFT 
FOR STIMPEL 379, 383–93 (1985). 
 21.  E.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at 996; Sosnitza, supra note 18, at para. 54; JAN WILHELM, 
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 259, para. 684 (3d ed. 2009). 
 22.  Lutz Michalski, Comment on § 1, GMBH-GESETZ para. 62; PAULICK, supra note 15; 
CHRISTINE WINDBICHLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 234, § 21 para. 40 (23d ed. 2013). 
 23.  Cf. Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 82; Sosnitza, supra note 18, at para. 54. 
 24.  See, e.g., WERNER FLUME, DIE JURISTISCHE PERSON 187 (1983); SCHMIDT, supra note 
20, at 995; WINDBICHLER, supra note 23 at para. 40; contra Kreutz, supra note 21, at 385. 
 25.  SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at 996; Steding, supra note 18; contra BRETSCHNEIDER, supra 
note 15, at 34–36; Kreutz, supra note 21, at 385. 
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functioning decision-making body.26  The idea behind this argument is that 
organizations must at least be able to make decisions in order to be bestowed 
with legal personhood.  While this idea seems plausible in principle, the 
argument loses much of its force once we consider autonomous systems, 
because it is precisely a core feature of such systems that they are able to 
take decisions independently of a governing group of human beings.  
Algorithms can take ‘decisions’ based on a finite set of if-then-rules, and 
artificial intelligence even allows for self-referential learning and truly 
‘autonomous’ decision-making. 
The dogmatic debate about memberless limited companies has shown 
that the main consideration against the existence of such companies is that 
they lack a decision-making body.  Yet autonomous systems can (or will 
someday be able to) take decisions themselves, so that they could serve as a 
means to overcome this core deficit of memberless limited companies.  By 
the same token, such a company could serve as an important legal tool for 
those autonomous systems and provide them with the shell of a legal person.  
That shell would ultimately confer legal personhood to autonomous systems 
under German law.  What seems more problematic, however, is whether 
autonomous systems could also direct the legal person, because § 6 para 2 
GmbHG allows only natural persons to act as directors of a LLC.  That 
provision is challenged on constitutional grounds, however, but it is difficult 
to predict whether the Constitutional Court will require legal persons also to 
be permitted as LLC directors.27 
In any event, German law — as that law currently exists — presents the 
possibility of an autonomous system exercising some or all the elements of 
legal personhood through the vehicle of a memberless limited liability 
company. 
B.  Autonomously Operated Entities under Swiss Law28 
In Switzerland, the question of whether, or to what extent, autonomous 
systems can be given de facto legal personhood has not been addressed yet.  
 
 26.  Buchwald, supra note 19; PETER KINDLER, GRUNDKURS HANDELS-UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT para. 106 (8th ed. 2016); WINDBICHLER, supra note 23. 
 27.  In a recent decision, the German Constitutional Court decided that a similar provision did 
not violate fundamental rights of legal persons, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG][Federal 
Constitutional Court], NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] Jan. 12, 2016, 930, 2016 
(Ger.). On potential consequences for § 6 para. 2 GmbHG cf. Markus Gehrlein, Leitung einer 
juristischen Person durch juristische Personen?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
(NZG) 566 (2016). 
 28.  The ideas expressed in this section are further elaborated in Daniel M. Häusermann, 
Memberless Legal Entities Operated by Autonomous Systems – Some Thoughts on Shawn Bayern’s 
Article ‘The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous 
  
144 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2 
Three Swiss legal entities look most promising in this regard — namely, the 
stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft),29 the limited liability company or 
LLC (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH),30 and the foundation 
(Stiftung).31  Before each of these entities is discussed, a few observations 
regarding the supreme governing body of such entities are in order. 
All private law entities in Switzerland are required to have a supreme 
governing body.  Depending on the type of entity, the supreme governing 
body may be a board of directors (in the case of a stock corporation), one or 
several managing officers (in the case of an LLC), or a board of trustees (in 
the case of a foundation).32  Only natural persons — that is, humans — are 
eligible to be appointed to such body.33  In contrast, Swiss corporate law does 
not prohibit legal entities from having an autonomous system take 
management decisions on their behalf.  Such an arrangement might, 
however, come with a practical drawback.  If the board of directors of a stock 
corporation duly delegates management to (human) managers, directors will 
be liable solely for breaches of their duty of care in selecting, instructing and 
monitoring managers.34  The situation is similar with a foundation, but 
unclear with an LLC.35  Swiss courts might deny this liability privilege to 
directors who have delegated management to an autonomous system and, as 
a result, directors may be liable for the system’s decisions as if they had taken 
them themselves.36 In any case, the requirement to have a supreme governing 
body consisting of humans is an important limitation to the possibility of 
giving an autonomous system de facto legal personhood using a Swiss 
private law entity. 
 
Systems’ from a Swiss Law Perspective, U. ST. GALLEN LAW & ECON. (Working Paper No. 2016-
06, Aug. 13, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2827504. 
 29.  Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR], CODE DES OBLIGATION [CO], CODICE DELLE 
OBLIGAZIONI [CO][CODE OF OBLIGATIONS]  Mar. 30, 1911, SR 211, art. 620 (Switz.). 
 30.  Id. art. 772. 
 31.  Cf. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE 
[CC] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 80 (Switz.). 
 32.  Cf. OR art. 707(1), 809(2); ZGB art. 83-83a. 
 33.  See OR art. 707(3), 809(2); HANDELSREGISTERVERORDNUNG [HREGV], ORDONNANCE 
SUR LE REGISTRE DU COMMERCE [ORC], ORDINANZA SUL REGISTRO DI COMMERCIO 
[ORC][COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE] Oct. 17, 2007, SR 221.411, art. 120 (Switz.). 
 34.  OR art. 754(2). 
 35. See Harold Grüninger, Art. 83, BASLER KOMMENTAR ZIVILGESETZBUCH I N 11a, N 19 
(Heinrich Honsell, Nedim Peter Vogt & Thomas Geiser eds., 4th ed., Basel 2010), (with regard to 
foundations); Dieter Gericke & Stefan Waller, Art. 827, BASLER KOMMENTAR 
OBLIGATIONENRECHT II N 8 (Heinrich Honsell, Nedim Peter Vogt & Rolf Watter eds., 4th ed., 
Basel 2012), (with regard to LLCs). 
 36.  But see OR art. 754(2). 
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A Swiss stock corporation may be formed for any lawful (for-profit or 
not-for-profit) purpose37 by one or more legal or natural person.38 Contrary 
to the situation in Germany (see above subsection A) it is clear under Swiss 
law that a corporation must not own all of its own shares and thus become a 
memberless entity.39  The reasons for this are mainly structural. A 
corporation may not vote its own shares; so if there were no shareholders 
other than the company, nobody could vote at the shareholders’ meetings to 
be held annually.40  The same reasoning applies in the case of circular 
ownership structures where a direct or indirect subsidiary of a corporation 
holds 100% of the shares of its parent.41 
Furthermore, a Swiss stock corporation is required to have a board of 
directors comprising at least one director.42  Only natural persons may be 
appointed as directors.43  The board of directors has certain mandatory 
responsibilities, such as the supreme oversight of the corporation.  These 
responsibilities cannot be waived or assigned to another body or entity,44 
whereas, if certain formalities are observed, the board may delegate the 
management of the corporation to one or several directors, other individuals 
or a management company.45  When the board has unlawfully delegated 
authority, the directors can be held liable for the actions of the persons to 
whom they (unlawfully) delegated authority as if they had performed them 
themselves.46  As explained, Swiss courts might not accept a delegation to 
 
 37.  See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Art. 620 at N 2.  See also OR art. 620(3). 
 38.  Cf. OR art. 625. 
 39.  See, e.g., PETER BÖCKLI, SCHWEIZER AKTIENRECHT § 1 N 62 (4th ed., Zurich 2009) and 
the references therein cited.  Some scholars believe that corporations may hold all of their own 
shares on a temporary basis. 
 40.  See OR art. 659a(1) and 699(2).  A further impediment to a repurchase of all shares 
against consideration is that a repurchase of more than 10% (and in certain limited cases more than 
20%) of the company’s share capital by the company is impermissible (even though sanctions are 
limited).  See also OR art. 659. 
 41.  See OR art. 659b(1). 
 42.  See OR art. 707(1). 
 43.  See OR art. 707(3); HREGV art. 120. 
 44.  See OR art. 716a(1). 
 45.  A delegation of management to a legal entity is permissible except for the mandatory 
responsibilities of the board of directors.  See TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] 
Oct. 13, 2011, 137 ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL SUISSE (RECEUIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] III 503, 
509–510 (Switz.).  Additional restrictions apply to listed companies, see VERORDNUNG GEGEN 
ÜBERMÄSSIGE VERGÜTUNGEN BEI BÖRSENKOTIERTEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN [VEGÜV] 
[ORDINANCE AGAINST EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION IN LISTED STOCK COMPANIES] Nov. 20, 2013, 
SR 221.331, art. 6 (Switz.). 
 46.  But see OR art. 754(2). 
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an autonomous system as lawful.47  While the system’s actions on behalf of 
the company would not be void or illegal, the director would bear the liability 
risk associated with unlawful delegation.  To mitigate that risk, the 
shareholder of the autonomously operating corporation could agree to 
indemnify the corporation’s director with respect to any claims that may be 
raised against him in connection with his activity — or, rather, passivity — 
as a director.48 
To summarize, an autonomous system cannot be given de facto legal 
personhood without human involvement by means of a Swiss stock 
corporation.  The corporation must have at least one shareholder and at least 
one natural person acting as director.  This notwithstanding, an autonomous 
system could operate the company’s business.  De facto, though not de jure, 
the autonomous system could even take the actions that are reserved to a 
director, provided that a director can be found who is comfortable with this 
setup — for example, because he or she is properly indemnified by the 
company’s shareholder(s). 
Basically the same applies mutatis mutandis to Swiss limited liability 
companies (LLCs).  An LLC may be formed for any lawful (for profit or not 
for profit) purpose49 and must have at least one member.  An LLC cannot 
lawfully acquire, either directly or via a subsidiary, 100% of its own capital.50  
A Swiss LLC must have at least one managing officer; managing officers 
must be natural persons.51  While the managing officers of an LLC have 
similar mandatory responsibilities as the board of directors of a stock 
corporation,52 it is not court-tested whether a managing officer of an LLC 
would benefit from the same liability privilege as a director of a stock 
corporation53 if he or she delegated day-to-day management to other 
individuals or a management company.54  In addition, “delegation” of all 
decision-making to an autonomous system may give rise to a similar liability 
risk as with directors of stock corporations.  Thus, a Swiss LLC is no more 
 
 47.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 48.  Indemnification by the company itself is only permissible to a limited extent.  See, e.g., 
BÖCKLI, supra note 40, at § 13 N 861.  The details are disputed in doctrine.  See id. 
 49.  See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Alexander Göbel & Philipp Speitler, Art. 772, supra note 
37, at N 38. 
 50.  See OR art. 783(1)-(2), 659b(1) in conjunction with 783(4). 
 51.  See OR art. 809(2). 
 52.  See OR art. 810(2).  A notable difference is that the articles of association may reserve 
the approval of certain matters by the company’s members.  See OR art. 811. 
 53.  See supra text accompanying notes 36, 38. 
 54.  See Dieter Gericke & Stefan Waller, Art. 827, supra note 37, at N 8 (most legal scholars 
believe that the liability privilege would not be applicable). 
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and no less suitable for giving de facto legal personhood to an autonomous 
system than a stock corporation. 
In contrast, private foundations organized under Swiss law may have 
interesting characteristics for autonomous systems.  While Swiss stock 
corporations and LLCs by definition have members,55 Swiss private law 
foundations cannot have members.  A foundation is an estate that a settlor 
dedicates to a given purpose; it is thus always a memberless legal entity.56  A 
foundation must have a supreme governing body, usually called board of 
trustees (Stiftungsrat), which oversees the foundation’s operations.57  Only 
natural persons may become members of the board of trustees.58  The Swiss 
government requires a board of trustees to have at least three members.59  In 
addition, Swiss foundations (putting aside certain exceptions not relevant here) 
are under permanent oversight by a governmental authority.60 
Foundations must not seek profit for profit’s own sake, but they are 
allowed to hold or operate a business.61  The range of permissible purposes 
of foundations is limited, the most important being purposes of charity 
(charitable foundations), well being of family members (family 
foundations), and provision of occupational benefits (pension foundations).62  
A foundation’s purpose must be stated in its objects clause and is considered 
to be the foundation’s heart and soul.63  The beneficiaries of a foundation, 
who by definition are legal or natural persons, are either defined explicitly 
in the objects clause or have to be derived from the purpose.64  Beneficiaries 
do not have to be identified specifically; the general public may be a 
beneficiary, as for example when a foundation’s purpose is to maintain a 
public garden.65  A foundation’s purpose may also be to preserve and foster 
 
 55.  See, e.g., ARTHUR MEIER-HAYOZ & PETER FORSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERISCHES 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT § 2 N 52 (11th ed., Berne 2012). 
 56.  Id. at N 53.  See also ZGB art. 80. 
 57.  Cf. ZGB art. 83; Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 3. 
 58.  HREGV art. 120.  This rule is subject to dispute in doctrine.  See, e.g., Grüninger, supra 
note 36, at N 5. 
 59.  EIDGENÖSSISCHES DEPARTEMENT DES INNERN EDI, LEITFADEN FÜR STIFTUNGEN 
GEMÄSS ART. 80 FF. [ZGB], § 10.1 (Nov. 2010), https://www.edi.admin.ch/edi/de/home/ 
fachstellen/eidgenoessische-stiftungsaufsicht/leitfaden-fuer-stiftungen.html. 
 60.  See ZGB art. 84. 
 61.  See Bundesgericht [BGer] May 18, 2001, 127 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTS 
(AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG) [BGE] III 337 cons. 2b-2c (Switz.); Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 15. 
 62.  See ZGB art. 87(1) and 89a; Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 1. 
 63.  See Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 12 and references cited therein. 
 64.  See Hans Michael Riemer, Art. 80, DAS PERSONENRECHT (BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHT) N 37 (3rd ed., Berne 1981). 
 65.  Id. 
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the business that it operates (so-called enterprise foundation).66  In that case, 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court assumes that all stakeholders of the 
business are the foundation’s beneficiaries.67 
Whether owning and operating an autonomous system would be a 
lawful purpose for a Swiss foundation depends on what that system would 
do.  An autonomous system working for the benefit of certain beneficiaries 
or the general public, by for example providing services on a not-for-profit 
basis, seems compatible with Swiss law.  However, authorities68 may require 
that the activities the system is to engage in be specified in the foundation’s 
objects clause.  If the autonomous system were to operate for its own sake 
(i.e., without benefitting anyone or anything, other than the autonomous 
system), the matter would become trickier.  On the one hand, a foundation 
may undoubtedly pursue eccentric or bizarre purposes, provided that it stays 
within the limits of public morals.69  From this perspective, giving de facto 
legal personhood to an autonomous system may be a permissible purpose.  
On the other hand, a foundation whose sole purpose is to operate an 
autonomous system arguably would not benefit anyone, not even the general 
public, and may therefore be impermissible due to a lack of beneficiaries.  
However, in general, it seems possible to define a foundation’s purpose in a 
way that is legally valid and achieves the goal of giving legal independence 
to an autonomous system. 
The two examples given in Part I — a business-like service that benefits 
its users, or a perpetual organization with a specified public mission — 
would embody permissible purposes under Swiss foundation law.  The test 
of a foundation’s public purpose by the authorities may thus serve as a 
functional regulatory barrier in Switzerland, whereas the generalized and 
somewhat formal understanding of the “purpose” of LLCs under U.S. law 
establishes no such restriction.  In addition, while under Swiss foundation 
law it seems generally possible to establish a foundation whose purpose is to 
house an autonomous system, the requirement of having a board of trustees 
composed of humans cannot be dispensed with.  Such a foundation would 
also be under permanent government oversight. 
 
 
 
 66.  See BGer, supra note 62. 
 67.  See Bundesgericht [BGer], May 18, 2001, docket no. 5C.9/2001, (not published in 127 
BGE III 337), cons. 3e/bb. 
 68.  The cantonal COMMERCIAL REGISTER reviews the deed of foundation before its 
registration, cf. OR art. 940. 
 69.  See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 65, at N 61; Id. Art. 84, at N 48. 
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C.  Autonomous Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships in the 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom law offers two principal business entities that are 
relevant to the ability of nonhuman autonomous systems to imitate legal 
personhood.  Those forms are the company70 and the Limited Liability 
Partnership (LLP).71 
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has, broadly speaking, a unified set of rules 
regarding the company form.  All companies in U.K. law, save those 
incorporated by Royal Charter or specific Act of Parliament, are formed 
under and governed by the provisions of the Companies Act 2006 and its 
predecessors. Within the Act different types of company are permitted.  The 
principal division is between “public” and “private.”  Private companies are, 
as their name suggests, not permitted to offer their shares for sale to the 
public,72 but they are not subject to any minimal capital requirement. 
Public companies must have at least two directors and private 
companies at least one director.73  In both cases, however, at least one 
director of the company must be a natural person.74  The Act currently 
permits corporate directors to hold office in a company as additional 
directors, but this rule is unlikely to endure.  The U.K. Parliament passed 
legislation in 201575 to amend the Act to ban corporate directors outright,76 
though the amendments to the Act have not yet been brought into force.  
Nonetheless, even the current requirement to have at least one director who 
is a natural person prevents a nonhuman autonomous system from 
exclusively inhabiting the corporate form in any way that could approximate 
to or imitate legal personhood. 
Limited liability partnerships (LLPs), on the other hand, are a relatively 
recent innovation in UK law, and they afford greater scope for autonomous 
systems to interact with the legal system without direct human involvement.  
The LLP form allows the partnership to benefit from separate legal 
personality and limited liability without adopting the traditional structure of 
a company.  Accordingly, the LLP is something of a hybrid between a private 
company and a general English partnership. 
 
 70.  Incorporated under the Companies Act, 2006 (U.K.). 
 71.  Incorporated under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000 (U.K.). 
 72.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 755 (U.K.). 
 73.  Id. § 154. 
 74.  Id. §§ 154-55. 
 75.  Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26, § 87 (U.K.). 
 76.  Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 156A (U.K.); exceptions may be provided under § 156B. 
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At the heart of the LLP regime is respect for the autonomy of the 
members of the LLP to organize its affairs through their “membership 
agreement.”77  LLPs are, for example, not required to have a board of 
directors separate from the members and so members are free to structure 
governance arrangements as they wish.  Deference to autonomy of the 
members of an LLP also finds expression in the lack of any requirement for 
LLP membership agreements to be publicly registered and disclosed (unlike 
the constitutional “articles of association” of companies78) or indeed, any 
requirement that membership agreements be written down.79  LLP 
agreements are, in essence, treated like contracts80 and are construed in 
accordance with normal rules of contractual interpretation.81 
Certain rules are set out in the LLP Act that identify LLPs closely with 
their members.  Each member of an LLP is, for example, designated by the 
LLP Act82 as an agent of the LLP (subject to restrictions on authority that the 
members may adopt in the LLP agreement).  The Act also requires LLPs to 
have a minimum of two members.83  Potentially relevant to the search for a 
legal housing for an autonomous system, the members of the LLP may be 
natural or legal persons.84 
The flexibility that characterizes the LLP in U.K. law offers two 
potential ways in which an autonomous system could interact with the legal 
system with no direct human intervention.  The first could be termed a “soft” 
arrangement whereby an LLP is formed by two corporate members who then 
adopt the acts of an autonomous system as the acts of the LLP in their LLP 
agreement on the basis of the algorithm-agreement equivalence principle.85  
The first step in this process should be uncontroversial.  The second step — 
that is, adoption of the acts of an autonomous system as the acts of the LLP 
— is novel, but there is nothing in principle that should prevent such an 
agreement from being concluded given the contractual nature of LLP 
agreements and the general emphasis on respect for party autonomy that is 
at the heart of the LLP regime.  Of course, the commercial sustainability of 
an LLP adopting the acts of an autonomous system would be conditional on 
 
 77.  Limited Liability Partnerships Act, c. 12, § 5(1) (U.K.). 
 78.  Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 18(2) (U.K.). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See, e.g., Rowe v. Aries Film Partner 1 Ltd [2016] EWCH 1800 (Ch). 
 82.  Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 6 (U.K.). 
 83.  Id. § 2(1)(a). 
 84.  JOHN WHITTAKER & JOHN MACHELL, LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE NEW 
LAW 9–10 (2001). 
 85.  Id. 
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the ability of an autonomous system to function in an effective commercial 
manner.  Assuming such technological ability, however, this arrangement 
could allow an autonomous system to interact with other legal persons 
directly without human intervention or agency. 
The members of the LLP would, of course, retain a role in the 
association under this arrangement and would be obliged to fulfill residual 
statutory functions allocated to members, such as authenticating LLP 
accounts and returns.86  Nonetheless, members could under this arrangement 
withdraw from the day-to-day business of the company.  And as the members 
would themselves be corporate bodies, the association could legally function 
within orthodox arrangements without human membership of the 
organization. 
Might it be possible to go even further and manipulate the LLP form so 
as to leave the autonomous system to inhabit the LLP without the 
involvement of any other legal person at all?  This might be possible if the 
members of an LLP were able to withdraw from the association, leaving the 
autonomous system to inhabit its personality alone.  This is the second, more 
speculative, way in which an autonomous system might interact with the 
legal system through the mechanism of an LLP, at least for a period of time. 
As we have mentioned, the LLP Act sets a minimum membership 
requirement of two members to create and operate an LLP.87  The LLP Act 
imposes personal liability on any member who allows an LLP to operate for 
more than six months with fewer than two members.88  But there is no explicit 
rule that requires an LLP to cease its business if it has fewer than two 
members, nor is there any provision for the automatic liquidation of such an 
LLP.89  So if both members of an LLP withdrew from the LLP 
simultaneously having previously concluded an agreement for the LLP to act 
through an autonomous system, the LLP could, in theory at least, continue 
to interact with the legal system effectively.  And of course in such a situation 
the personal liability provision in s. 4A of the LLP Act would have no effect 
because, assuming simultaneous withdrawal, no single member would have 
breached the provision.90 
There is as such no formal statutory limitation on the period during 
which an LLP could, in theory, operate without any members and, as such, 
 
 86.  See, e.g., Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1911, Reg.12 (U.K.). 
 87.  Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 2(1) (U.K.). 
 88.  Id. § 4A(2). 
 89.  WHITTAKER & MACHELL, supra note 85, at 60. 
 90.  Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 4A(2) (U.K.). 
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the U.K. LLP, much like the U.S. LLC,91 would seem to offer some prospect 
for an autonomous system to exclusively inhabit an incorporated legal 
person in a manner that would closely mimic legal personhood for the system 
itself, at least for a period of time.  Such an arrangement is, however, unlikely 
to be stable.  A key risk for an LLP without members would be a petition for 
winding up by one of its creditors.  The winding up of LLPs is governed by 
the legislation for winding up companies92 in the Insolvency Act 1986 and a 
‘memberless’ LLP, even if solvent, could be wound up under s. 122(1)(c) of 
that Act93 on an application from a creditor or other contributory.94  Moreover, 
a memberless LLP would be unable to comply with statutory accounting and 
filing obligations95 that require the authentication of members,96 and persistent 
default in filing could, eventually, result in the striking off of the LLP from the 
register (effective liquidation) by the U.K. registrar of companies on the ground 
of apparent inactivity.97 
The techniques outlined here in respect of the ways in which an 
autonomous system could inhabit the personality of a U.K. LLP and interact 
with the legal system through it are, of course, speculative as a matter of 
practical law (such approaches have to our knowledge not been the subject 
of litigation), though it is hopefully clear that the most successful approach 
is likely to be that which retains traditional membership of the LLP by at 
least two members.  More generally, U.K. courts have taken a pragmatic 
approach to the development and use of corporate personalities in the past.  
Going forward, this flexibility could readily accommodate technological 
advances in artificial intelligence.  We need think only of the seminal case 
of Salomon v. Salomon,98 where the English courts recognized the separate 
legal personality of the “one person” company without any apparent 
difficulty, when it had been hitherto widely believed that the Companies Act 
then in force had not intended to grant legal personality to such entities.  
“Private” one-person companies were however a commercial fact that 
 
 91.  Bayern, supra note 2. 
 92.  Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1090, Reg. 5 (U.K.). 
 93.  Id. sch. 3. 
 94.  Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 124 (U.K.). 
 95.  The Limited Liability Partnerships (Accounts and Audit) (Application of Companies Act 
2006) Regulations 2008, S.I. 2008/1911, Reg. 4 (U.K.) (applying accounting and auditing 
provisions of the 2006 Act to LLPs). 
 96.  See id. Reg. 12. 
 97.  The Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of the Companies Act 2006) Regulations, 
2009, S.I. 2009/1804, Reg. 50 (U.K.) (applying §§ 1000-1002 of the 2006 Act to LLPs). 
 98.  Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.). 
  
SUMMER 2017] COMPANY LAW AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 153 
developed through the latter half of the 19th century,99 and their recognition 
as legal persons was reached without U.K. courts troubling themselves with 
philosophical questions about the nature and validity of the legal personality 
in “one-person” entities.100  Of course in the subsequent century there has 
been a tendency to invest the Salomon decision with a certain economic 
rationality on the basis that whilst the separate legal personhood of one-
person entities may be a “fiction,” it is an economically desirable fiction.  
But that rationality was not the driving force behind the decision itself. 
Our purpose in highlighting the pragmatic approach of U.K. law to 
corporate legal personality here is therefore simply to point out that whilst 
many practical and theoretical problems might be posed by granting legal 
personhood to an autonomous system, U.K. law is likely to focus on practical 
solutions and to this extent it is quite possible that the flexibility inherent in U.K. 
corporate law develops in a manner that allows autonomous systems, as an 
increasingly present commercial fact, to inhabit corporate forms in a way that 
approximates to some form of legal personhood. 
III. The Implications of Legal Personality 
In our examination of whether legal entities under different legal orders 
would be able to house an autonomous system, four horizontal issues arise.  
First (section II.A), there are issues of constitutionality: Would the 
constitutional jurisprudence of corporations apply to those inhabited by 
autonomous systems?  Second (section II.B), there are issues of functional 
or effective influence: Even if an artificial intelligence never formally takes 
over an organization, it might gain influence or control over it in practice; 
what legal consequences might this have?  Third (section II.C), there are 
issues of how to deal with legal uncertainty in a transitory phase: when the 
lex lata is applied to bestow legal personality upon an artificial intelligence, 
rules normally governing a “transitory phase” are involved.  Finally (section 
II.D), we consider temporal issues: organizational rules may be eternalized 
when an artificial intelligence is permanently hosted in an organization. 
 
 99.  See e.g., REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE BOARD OF 
TRADE TO INQUIRE WHAT AMENDMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE ACTS RELATING TO JOINT 
STOCK COMPANIES INCORPORATED WITH LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862 
TO 1890, 1895 [C. 7779], ¶ 12. 
 100.  Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1450 (2006). 
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A.  Constitutionality 
Does an autonomous system in an LLC organized under U.S. law, a no-
man’s GmbH in German law, a foundation governed by Swiss law, or an 
LLP organized under British law hold constitutional rights?  Imagine a state 
expropriating property from a legal person, refusing to grant it a business 
license, or prohibiting it from communicating a viewpoint.  How does a court 
respond to a personless organization asserting constitutional rights to defend 
against such measures? The law could be read in (at least) three ways. 
On one reading — perhaps a formalist one — the court would hold that 
an autonomous system in an organization may invoke constitutional rights 
merely by virtue of the organization’s status as a legal entity.  On this view, 
it does not matter who is within or behind the organization.  Any legal person 
should enjoy the constitutional rights developed in case law — e.g., the right 
to own property — if only to facilitate doing business.101 
On a less formalist reading of the rights of legal entities, constitutional 
courts could give a different answer.  On this view, an organization holds 
constitutional rights only because natural persons act collectively through it.  
Natural persons do not forfeit their rights solely because they act together.102  
 
 101.  It is generally understood to be settled law in the Western world that regular legal persons 
such as companies hold at least some constitutional rights.  (The law is not settled with regard to 
constitutional rights of companies based on public-private partnerships, however. See Peter Selmer, 
§53: Zur Grundrechtsberechtigung von Mischunternehmen, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE 
(HGR) II, 1255, 1255-1291 (2007).)  Which rights specifically they hold is typically decided on 
case-by-case basis.  For the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, see Beatrice Weber-Dürler, §205: 
Träger der Grundrechte, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE (HGR) II 79–99 (2007).  The German 
Constitution includes a general clause in article 19(3), see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I 
(Ger.), which states that legal persons hold all fundamental rights which owing to their “nature” 
(“Wesen”) lend themselves to being held by a legal person.  Subsequent case law clarified the 
nature of rights in this regard for each constitutional right.  See Peter J. Tettinger, §51 Juristische 
Personen des Privatrechts als Grundrechtsträger, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE (HGR) II 1203–
1233 (2006).  The European Court of Human Rights also applied a case-by-case approach with the 
rights under the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
and the European Union’s foundational treaties.  Both these courts, however, only implicitly decided 
on the capacity of legal persons to hold rights, for instance by allowing companies to claim violation 
of the right to own property.  See Tettinger, supra, at 1229, N 71 and 73; see FACTSHEET–COMPANIES: 
VICTIMS OR CULPRITS, EUR. CT.H.R. (July 2013) (for the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights as to companies), http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/FS_Companies_ENG.pdf. For the U.S., 
see Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What if Corporations Aren’t People?, 44 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 701, 705 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873158 (mentioning a “pattern of case-by-case 
adjudication”). 
 102.  See Shapiro & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 707 (“Corporations are useful legal fictions 
composed of individuals who do not shed their own constitutional rights at the office-building 
door.”)  This reading lifts the “corporate veil,” which happens only exceptionally in corporate law.  
See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 40, ¶ 57 (Feb. 5) (the corporate veil is lifted only “in exceptional circumstances”).  
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Given that natural persons are absent when an autonomous system alone 
inhabits an organization, on this view there would be no reason for the 
organization to hold constitutional rights. 
A third, pragmatic reading might occupy the middle ground.  It would 
differentiate among constitutional rights, recognizing that an autonomous 
system in an organization holds certain rights — e.g., the right to property 
— while other rights, typically those with a more “human touch,” remain out 
of reach.103  Organizations inhabited by artificial intelligence could thus be 
barred from claiming free speech in order to influence voters in elections.104  
How and where to place the dividing line may well give rise to considerable 
differences. 
Which of the three approaches the law will take might depend upon when 
the law comes to address the matter.  Constitutional law might address 
artificial intelligence in organizations at an earlier (i) or later stage (ii). 
i) Constitutional law could preclude the formation of an organization 
around an artificial intelligence in the first place, thus barring it from being 
treated as a legal person.105  In continental legal orders like Germany, a 
litigant might invoke human dignity to rule out a rights-holding autonomous 
system, even if company law, taken in isolation, did not prohibit it.106  A 
clear exclusion — a preemptive strike by constitutional judges against a 
constitutional rights-holding artificial intelligence — is unlikely, however, 
 
On lifting the corporate veil in the context of constitutional rights, see Thorsten Kingreen Florian 
Möslein, Die Identität der juristischen Person: Die Hobby Lobby-Entscheidung des U.S. Supreme 
Court zur Glaubensfreiheit gewinnorientierter Kapitalgeselschaften, JURISTEN ZEITUNG (JZ) 57 
(2016). 
 103.  Malte-Christian Gruber, Was spricht gegen Maschinenrechte?, AUTONOME AUTOMATEN. 
KÜNSTLICHE ROBOTER UND ARTIFIZIELLE AGENTEN IN DER TECHNISIERTEN GESELLSCHAFT, 
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because artificial intelligence (and autonomous systems generally) develop 
gradually in small steps. 
ii) Even if an organization hosting an autonomous system could 
lawfully be brought into existence and hold constitutional rights, protection 
for general public morals could intervene at a later stage.  Protection of ordre 
public or public policy is contained in some or another form in most 
(probably all) constitutional orders.  It is embodied in various international 
instruments.107  In international humanitarian law, there is the catchall 
concept of the “public conscience of mankind” (Martens Clause, 1899 Hague 
Convention and its progeny).  Conceivably, public morals could be invoked 
to annul or otherwise limit the effect of specific conduct of an organization 
hosting an artificial intelligence. 
Finally, a government could itself establish an organization hosting an 
autonomous system, for instance, in order to outsource public tasks and 
services to it.  Automated driving provides at least limited examples for 
autonomous systems to enter into markets, and artificial intelligence may 
soon steer public buses; much of tax assessment has been automated already 
in many countries, so entrusting it to an artificial intelligence inhabiting its 
own legal entity seems a plausible eventual step.  Pressure to increase 
productivity and save taxpayers’ money is already weighing in and forcing 
the hands of human governments.  However, do citizens have the right to be 
driven by human chauffeurs or talk to human tax officials at any point?  
Today, in many countries it is already difficult to reach a human in the 
interaction with tax authorities.  Lodging an artificial intelligence in an 
organization with legal personality may extend the “computer loop,” 
possibly attenuating the human operator’s role to the vanishing point.  By 
implication the question becomes urgent: do we need to define essential tasks 
of the state that must be fulfilled by human beings under all circumstances? 
B.  Informal Influence 
Constitutional law is one thing; reality is often another.  Even though 
the law may formally preclude an autonomous system from taking over an 
organization, such a system could still gain influence over an entity or the 
human beings running it.  The concern is not necessarily that an artificial 
intelligence might sneak up on the leadership of a company.  Rather, the 
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manner in which the human decision-makers relate to an autonomous system 
in their company is the matter to keep in mind.  If an artificial intelligence 
had qualities that the human decision-makers in a company found useful, it 
could gain influence on their decision-making. 
In a limited way, existing machines already exert influence: A board of 
directors makes sure to keep engineers on the payroll who are needed to run 
a machine that is necessary to carry out the company’s functions; they make 
sure the electricity bills are paid to keep it running.  One might say that that 
machine is influencing the board. But that machine is not yet participating in 
decision-making; it is not engaging in a discourse with the human beings 
about their decisions. 
An artificial intelligence in the future conceivably could do this, 
however.  Though legal corporate governance rules may make no provision 
for an artificial intelligence to run a company — or may even preclude it — 
the door would open to the artificial intelligence to exert influence.  In this 
case, one thing to watch for is the quality of the relationship between the 
artificial intelligence and the human decision-makers.  How often do the 
human decision-makers turn to the artificial intelligence for analysis or for 
answers to questions?  What matters are they asking it to analyze, and what 
sort of questions are they asking it to answer?  How often do they invoke the 
artificial intelligence’s input as justification for decisions?  Reference to an 
artificial intelligence could become deference when routine dulls the senses  
— which is why a driver cannot always be expected to intervene in a system 
that drives a car autonomously even in case of danger, and why doctors need 
to be careful when they receive counsel from a machine.  Similarly, decision-
makers in companies involving artificial intelligence may have to be careful.  
The law of business organizations for a long time has been concerned with 
the duty of care of the business manager; the introduction of an autonomous 
system might simply be a new factual situation, which the existing law is 
perfectly capable of addressing, but it may take more than one dispute to 
figure out exactly how. 
C.  At the Inception – Or at the End? 
Legal rules exist for the purpose of regulating the terminal phase of a 
company, by allowing it to be wound up in an orderly manner; others govern 
the transition towards new owners, such as heirs.  Reflecting the purpose of 
such rules, they do not apply for an indefinite period; their application is 
transitory.  Across national jurisdictions, the diversity of rules dealing with 
the expiration of organizations and the deaths of persons is vast.  However, 
many such rules have one thing in common: they deal with the situation in 
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which the human being who was once involved (whether directly or 
indirectly) has left the scene. 
Our legal systems, accordingly, are familiar with entities that have lost 
their human participants.  An actor who seeks to vest an autonomous system 
with legal personality might look to the rules that exist to deal with entities 
in that stage of their life cycle.  We should not dismiss out of hand the 
possibility that the existing rules in a particular legal system might be 
adapted to accommodate an entity that is “personless” by design.  The entity 
continues to exercise the rights and observe the obligations that follow from 
its prior recognition as a legal person.  Creditors, for instance, can sue it — 
the protection of creditors indeed being one of the main purposes of the rules 
concerning the transitory phase of an organization.  This is the state of affairs 
that one would aim for if one’s goal were to give an autonomous system a 
legal framework in which to interact with the world.  That is, one would aim 
to set up an organization from which the human participants have withdrawn, 
but which retains the capacity to be a debtor, a creditor, and a contracting 
party for whatever purpose.  Extending the application of the transitory rules 
to a new situation, the autonomous system would exercise rights and honor 
obligations, as if human beings were still involved.  The transitory rules 
would be applied, in effect, to afford the autonomous system legal 
personality, or at least enough of the functional incidents of legal personality 
to be indistinguishable from it. 
Using the transitory rules in this way would eventually raise significant 
questions.  Would an entity in its winding-up phase — including an 
autonomous system with legal capacity — be able to enter into new 
contracts, and if so to what extent? How well would the entity’s existing 
legal relationships (i.e., the relationships established before the winding-up 
procedure began) hold up?  While positive company and insolvency law 
generally answer these questions, issues specific to the artificially intelligent 
organization are harder to tackle.  Transitory rules might be a pathway for 
the artificial intelligence to reach legal capacity, but this implies preserving 
for an indefinite time a state of affairs that was intended to be temporary.  
Most legal systems are past the point where, for example, inheritance law 
once resulted in unsettled disputes giving a decedent’s estate a decades-long 
twilight existence; and even Jarndyce v. Jarndyce eventually came to a close 
— Dickensian spoiler alert! — because the estate ran out of money to pay 
the lawyers. 
Yet, in a world of emerging autonomous systems — a world in which 
the lawyer’s creativity is no less than it was in generations past — legal rules 
designed to deal with the terminal phases of entities and people merit 
consideration.  How long might a terminal phase be extended under those 
rules?  Should we think about time limits and, if so, what are the appropriate 
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limits?  Should a development that might have as much social and legal 
impact as vesting legal personality in an artificial intelligence be based on 
rules of transitory character designed to perform a very different function?  
Beyond these fundamental questions, the legal rules concerning the terminal 
phase of a legal entity should be a focus of consideration, as we watch for 
the emergence of an autonomous-system-driven organization.  In particular, 
the application of those rules in practice should be watched.  Legal rules 
intended to address transitory situations have more than once been extended 
indefinitely and thus been transformed into permanent arrangements — or at 
least have lasted long enough to leave the human subjects of the law in a 
state of perplexity. 
D.  The Reality of Control 
It is inherent in the logic of hosting an autonomous system in a legal 
entity that it works independently from the degree of intelligence the entity 
possesses.  The entity’s constitutional document simply refers to the “will” 
or “decisions” — more abstractly, the arbitrary state — of the autonomous 
system, regardless of how far advanced it is, and legal personality is 
bestowed upon it as a consequence of organizational law. 
This state of affairs may be easy to understand when the “housed” 
autonomous system performs only simple, straightforward tasks.  But the 
considerations inevitably would become more complex, when the “housed” 
system begins to think intelligently and begins to perform more complex 
tasks — including the meta-task of deciding what tasks to perform, when, 
and how.  For the foreseeable future, artificial intelligence will not be 
general, but rather specific and sectorial.  Nor will it be independent from 
humans.  Instead it will be symbiotic with humans relying on their support 
as they, in turn, will look to it for help.  Humans and artificial intelligence 
will be mutually dependent. 
This raises two points with regard specifically to artificial intelligence 
in an entity.  First, circumstances might change.  With an artificial 
intelligence hosted in an entity from which all human participants have 
withdrawn, a change in circumstances may become hard to accommodate.  
How can the constitutional documents of an entity be changed when the 
founders no longer have the power to intervene?  Laying down the objective 
of an organization for eternity is notoriously difficult.  With the founders/
participants “out of the loop,” an organization hosting an artificial 
intelligence may become immutable.  “Decentralized autonomous 
organizations” linked to block chains have faced similar problems.  When 
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baked in block chain commands turn out to be unwise, someone must have 
the power to change them — which stands in contradiction to their nature.108 
Immutability leads to the second point.  True to symbiosis, an artificial 
intelligence looking to accommodate change will contract human help. Enter 
the programmer.  A programmer may gain significant influence over the 
artificial intelligence.  In fact, the programmer may be the only one having 
any influence over it, if only by doing a good — or bad — job of re-
programming.  However, like managers, programmers have no formal role 
in decision-making in an organization, despite their effective impact.  Thus 
the gap between the law and reality widens. 
IV. Conclusion 
Where would a creative entrepreneur house an autonomous system so 
as to render it maximally capable of interacting with the legal order?  None 
of the organizations we scrutinized matches the flexibility of the U.S. limited 
liability company (LLC).  For the German equivalent, the Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung, German scholarship is generally skeptical whether it 
can exist as a personless company, a “Kein-Mann–GmbH.”  While housing 
an autonomous system in this form of German company is not categorically 
excluded, a human member must be there to chaperone it. 
The most flexible entity British law offers, the Limited Liability 
Partnership (LLP), is at least theoretically capable of hosting an autonomous 
system.  It bestows legal personality like the U.S. LLC.  Provided that both 
members of a British LLP withdraw simultaneously, it continues to exist, 
though it is uncertain for how long.  More doubts thus linger under current 
British than U.S. law. 
A Swiss Stiftung (Foundation) seems well designed to host an 
autonomous system, since it provides legal personhood to an estate devoted 
to a specific purpose.  Since there are few restrictions as to such purposes, it 
generally seems possible to establish a Foundation whose purpose is to house 
an autonomous system that engages in certain specified activities.  Yet, 
unlike the U.S. LLC, an autonomous system inhabiting a Foundation needs 
collaborators on a permanent basis: The board of trustees must be humans 
beings who, when they defer to the autonomous system, run the risk of being 
held liable for the decisions that they implement. 
The above options have given rise to certain concerns.  Autonomous 
systems housed in entities, for instance, may be able to claim constitutional 
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rights. Is this desirable?  The techniques developed above also put rules to 
creative use that were designed solely to govern certain transitional phases 
in the life cycle of organizations.  Should creative entrepreneurs be allowed 
to extend such transitional phases ad infinitum?  Even if company law or 
constitutional law heeded these concerns and denied autonomous systems 
legal personhood, policy makers cannot afford to ignore more complex 
transactional arrangements.  For instance, autonomous systems could gain 
practical influence over human managers and board members.  Their sheer 
usefulness could dull humans and make them complacent, leaving 
autonomous systems de facto in charge of companies.  Programmers might 
then be alone in exercising real and meaningful influence over autonomous 
systems and — by extension — over the companies that those systems 
influence or control.  However, current company law has little or nothing to 
say about programmers or autonomous systems. 
We conclude with a further possibility of interest to both entrepreneurs 
and regulators: iIn today’s interconnected world, an entity registered in one 
jurisdiction may qualify to “do business” in another.  Thus, for example, a 
U.S. LLC might operate in Germany.  It is unclear the extent to which 
jurisdictions will tolerate novel uses of existing foreign business forms.  
Mutual recognition of business forms across national legal systems would 
seem to assume familiarity with the forms — and with the functional 
purposes for which the forms are employed.  Harnessing company law to 
house an autonomous system likely would attract challenges in the 
jurisdictions where it is attempted — and in other jurisdictions where it might 
have effects. 
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